Something has gone wrong with your case preparation or ability to ready for trial on the date ordered by the trial court. You want the trial judge to continue the trial date. Your opponent objects.
What does Tennessee law say about the issue?
Here the answer as provided by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Patton v. Camboy, No. E2023-00231-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2023), in a case where the stated reason for a continuance was the employment of new counsel.
Decisions regarding continuances are fact-specific, and thus, should be viewed in the context of the circumstances existing when the motion is filed. Nagarajan v. Terry, 151 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). “Among the factors that courts consider are: (1) the length of time the proceeding has been pending, (2) the reason for the continuance, (3) the diligence of the party seeking the continuance, and (4) the prejudice to the requesting party if the continuance is not granted.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
The party seeking a continuance carries the burden of proving the circumstances that justify the continuance. Howell v. Ryerkerk, 372 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Osagie v. Peakload Temp. Services, 91 S.W.3d 326, 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). This burden will be met if the moving party supplies some “strong excuse” for postponing the trial date. Id. (citing Barber & McMurry, Inc. v. Top-Flite Dev. Corp. Inc., 720 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)) (citation omitted).
Id. at *11.
As stated above, the defendant in Patton argued that she had fired her lawyer and her new lawyer needed more time to prepare for trial. The appellate court said this in response:
Defendant’s decision to discharge her second counsel and to retain Mr. McClanahan was voluntary, meaning that there is no proof that her second counsel abandoned her. Moreover, Defendant was aware of the trial date when she retained Mr. McClanahan. Thus, Defendant should have foreseen that her counsel would have limited time to prepare for trial. As this court judiciously explained in Barish v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. Tenn., 627 S.W.2d 953 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), if a trial court were to grant a continuance to every party who decided to dismiss its attorney shortly before trial, then “every litigant could keep changing lawyers shortly before trial, seek and obtain a continuance and never have to face the ‘day of reckoning.’” Id. at 954.
Id. at 12.
The Court added this footnote at the first sentence:
This court has previously held that a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance is not in error when the moving party willingly dismisses its previous counsel shortly before trial. See Holley v. Ortiz, No. M2015-01432-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 729754, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2017) (Finding that denial of a motion for continuance was proper when the plaintiffs dismissed their counsel days before trial, and were thus responsible for their predicament); see also State Dep’t of Child.’s Servs. v. V.N., 279 S.W.3d 306, 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (Finding that a trial court did not err in denying a mother’s motion for continuance when she dismissed her former attorney forty-five days before her parental termination proceeding).
Id. at fn. 13.
The Court went on to explain that prejudice was a factor to be weighed by the trial judge:
This Court must consider “the prejudice to the requesting party if the continuance
is not granted.” Howell, 372 S.W.3d at 582 (quoting Nagarajan, 151 S.W.3d at 172). Here,
however, there is no evidence to support a finding that Defendant was prejudiced by the
denial of her motion for a continuance. Conversely, there is evidence to support a finding
that Plaintiffs may have been prejudiced by a continuance of the trial date because a delay
of trial would have risked the unavailability of two of Plaintiffs’ witnesses who were
elderly—Sam and Wendell Houston—and who had historical knowledge of Old Ridge
Road.
Id. at 12.
If you don’t convince the trial judge that a continuance is necessary, you face a tough row-to-hoe on appeal:
We review the granting or denial of a motion for a continuance under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re C.T.S., 156 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); see also Blake v. Plus Mark, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tenn. 1997) (“The granting or denial of a
motion for a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the court”) (citation omitted). “In
order to show an abuse of discretion, the moving party must show some prejudice or
surprise which arises from the trial court’s failure to grant the continuance.” Commission
of Dept. of Transp. v. Hall, 635 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tenn. 1982) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
Id. at 11.