The plaintiff in a civil case had a problem. Her counsel had withdrawn from representing her, and a hearing on a motion for summary judgment was on the horizon. She asked the court to continue the hearing. The request was denied, and summary judgment was entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The appellate opinion in this case gives us a ready guide to the law of motions to continue:
Continuances are governed by Tennessee Code Annotated 20-7-101
(2009), which provides in pertinent part that continuances “may always be
granted by the court, upon good cause shown, in any stage of the action.”
A ruling on a motion for continuance is a matter of discretion for the trial
court and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse of that
discretion. See Tipton v. Smith, 593 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1979). Decisions regarding the granting or denial of a continuance are fact specific and should be viewed in the context of all existing circumstances
present at the time of the party’s request for continuance. See Nagarajan v.
Terry, 151 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). In order to prove that a
requested continuance is justified, the party requesting the continuance
“must supply some ‘strong excuse’ for postponing the trial date.” Howell v.
Ryerkerk, 372 S.W.3d 576, 580-81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Barber
& McMurray, Inc. v. Top-Flite Dev. Corp. Inc., 720 S.W.2d 469, 471
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)). When considering a motion for continuance, the
following factors are relevant to the trial court’s decision: “‘(1) the length
of time the proceeding has been pending, (2) the reason for the continuance,
(3) the diligence of the party seeking the continuance, and (4) the prejudice
to the requesting party if the continuance is not granted.’” Howell, 372
S.W.3d at 580-81 (quoting Nagarajan, 151 S.W.3d at 172). Although this
Court rarely interferes with a trial court’s decision regarding the granting or denial of continuances, “we are constrained to do so where it is made to
appear . . . that the ends of justice probably require it.” Clark v. Jarrett, 61
Tenn. 467 (1873); see also Morrow v. Sneed, 114 S.W. 201, 201 (Tenn.
1908) (“[F]orcing [the plaintiff] to trial under the circumstances worked a
hardship, and was not warranted by any equitable consideration or legal
necessity.”); cf. Turtle Creek Apartments v. Polk, 958 S.W.2d 789, 791-92
(Tenn. Ct. App 1997) (affirming denial of a continuance under a
distinguishable factual situation from that in Morrow ).